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Abstract. Several identity based and implicitly authenticated key agreement pro-
tocols have been proposed in recent years and none of them has achieved all re-
quired security properties. In this paper, we propose an efficient identity-based
and authenticated key agreement protocol IDAK using Weil/Tate pairing. The se-
curity of IDAK is proved in Bellare-Rogaway model. Several required properties
for key agreement protocols are not implied by the Bellare-Rogaway model. We
proved these properties for IDAK separately.
1 Introduction
Key establishment protocols are one of the most important cryptographic primitives
that have been used in our society. The first unauthenticated key agreement protocol
based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques were proposed by Diffie and Hellman
[15]. Since this seminal result, many authenticated key agreement protocols have been
proposed and the security properties of key agreement protocols have been extensively
studied. In order to implement these authenticated key agreement protocols, one needs
to get the corresponding party’s authenticated public key. For example, in order for Al-
ice and Bob to execute the NIST recommended MQV key agreement protocol [20,26],
Alice needs to get an authenticated public key gb for Bob and Bob needs to get an
authenticated public key ga for Alice first, where a and b are Alice and Bob’s private
keys respectively. One potential approach for implementing these schemes is to deploy
a public key infrastructure (PKI) system, which has proven to be difficult. Thus it is
preferred to design easy to deploy authenticated key agreement systems. Identity based
key agreement system is such an example.
In 1984, Shamir [32] proposed identity based cryptosystems where user’s identities
(such as email address, phone numbers, office locations, etc.) could be used as the public
keys. Several identity based key agreement protocols (see, e.g., [11,17,22,27,30,31,33,36,38])
have been proposed since then. Most of them are not practical or do not have all re-
quired security properties. Joux [18] proposed a one-round tripartite non-identity based
key agreement protocol using Weil pairing. Then feasible identity based encryption
schemes based on Weil or Tate paring were introduced by Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasa-
hara [30] and later by Boneh and Franklin [7] independently.
Based on Weil and Tate pairing techniques, Smart [36], Chen-Kudla [11], Scott [31],
Shim [33], and McCullagh-Barreto [22] designed identity based and authenticated key
agreement protocols. Chen-Kudla [11] showed that Smart’s protocol is not secure in
several aspects. Cheng et al. [13] pointed out that Chen-Kudla’s protocol is not secure
againt unknown key share attacks. Scott’s protocol is not secure against man in the
middle attacks. Sun and Hsieh [37] showed that Shim’s protocol is insecure against key
compromise impersonation attacks or man in the middle attacks. Choo [14] showed that
McCullagh and Barreto’s protocol is insecure against key revealing attacks. McCullagh
and Barreto [23] revised their protocol. But the revised protocol does not achieve weak
perfect forward secrecy property. In this paper, we propose an efficient identity based
and authenticated key agreement protocol achieving all security properties that an au-
thenticated key agreement protocol should have.
The advantage of identity based key agreement is that non-PKI system is required.
The only prerequisite for executing identity based key agreement protocols is the de-
ployment of authenticated system-wide parameters. Thus, it is easy to implement these
protocols in relatively closed environments such as government organizations and com-
mercial entities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2 we briefly describe bi-
linear maps, bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, and its variants. In §3, we describe our
identity based and authenticated key agreement protocol IDAK. §4 describes a secu-
rity model for identity based key agreement. In section §5, we prove the security of
IDAK key agreement protocol. In sections §6 and §7, we discuss key compromise im-
personation resilience and perfect forward secrecy properties of IDAK key agreement
protocol.
2 Bilinear maps and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions
In the following, we briefly describe the bilinear maps and bilinear map groups. The
details could be found in Joux [18] and Boneh and Franklin [7].
1. G and G1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q.
2. g is a generator of G.
3. eˆ : G×G→ G1 is a bilinear map.
A bilinear map is a map eˆ : G×G→ G1 with the following properties:
1. bilinear: for all g1, g2 ∈ G, and x, y ∈ Z , we have eˆ(gx1 , g
y
2) = eˆ(g1, g2)
xy
.
2. non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently
and there exists a groupG1 and an efficiently computable bilinear map eˆ : G×G→ G1
as above. Concrete examples of bilinear groups are given in [18,7]. For convenience,
throughout the paper, we view both G and G1 as multiplicative groups though the con-
crete implementation of G could be additive elliptic curve groups.
Throughout the paper efficient means probabilistic polynomial-time, negligible refers
to a function εk which is smaller than 1/kc for all c > 0 and sufficiently large k, and
overwhelming refers to a function 1− εk for some negligible εk. Consequently, a func-
tion δk is non-negligible if there exists a constant c and there are infinitely many k such
that δk > 1/kc. We first formally define the notion of a bilinear group family and com-
putational indistinguishable distributions (some of our terminologies are adapted from
Boneh [6]).
Bilinear group families A bilinear group family G is a set G = {Gρ} of bilinear groups
Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉 where ρ ranges over an infinite index set, G and G1 are two groups
of prime order qρ, and eˆ : G × G → G1 is a bilinear map. We denote by |ρ| the
length of the binary representation of ρ. We assume that group and bilinear operations
in Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉 are efficient in |ρ|. Unless specified otherwise, we will abuse our
notations by using q as the group order instead of qρ in the remaining part of this paper.
Instance generator An Instance Generator, IG, for a bilinear group family G is a
randomized algorithm that given an integer k (in unary, that is, 1k), runs in polynomial-
time in k and outputs some random index ρ for Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉, and a generator g
of G, where G and G1 are groups of prime order q. Note that for each k, the Instance
Generator induces a distribution on the set of indices ρ.
The following Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (BDH) has been used by Boneh
and Franklin [7] to show security of their identity-based encryption scheme.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family and g be
a generator for G, where Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉. The BDH problem in G is as follows: given
〈g, gx, gy, gz〉 for some x, y, z ∈ Z∗q , compute eˆ(g, g)xyz ∈ G1. A CBDH algorithm
C for G is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can compute the function
BDHg(g
x, gy, gz) = eˆ(g, g)xyz in Gρ with a non-negligible probability. That is, for
some fixed c we have
Pr [C(ρ, g, gx, gy, gz) = eˆ(g, g)xyz] ≥
1
kc
(1)
where the probability is over the random choices of x, y, z in Z∗q , the index ρ, the
random choice of g ∈ G, and the random bits of A.
CBDH Assumption. The bilinear group family G = {Gρ} satisfies the CBDH-Assumption
if there is no CBDH algorithm for G. A perfect-CBDH algorithm C for G is a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can compute the function BDHg(gx, gy, gz) =
eˆ(g, g)xyz inGρ with overwhelming probability.G satisfies the perfect-CBDH-Assumption
if there is no perfect-CBDH algorithm for G.
Theorem 1. A bilinear group family G satisfies the CBDH-Assumption if and only if it
satisfies the perfect-CBDH-Assumption.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Consider Joux’s tripartite key agreement protocol [18]: Alice, Bob, and Carol fix
a bilinear group 〈G,G1, eˆ〉. They select x, y, z ∈R Z∗q and exchange gx, gy , and gz .
Their shared secret is eˆ(g, g)xyz. To totally break the protocol a passive eavesdropper,
Eve, must compute the BDH function: BDHg(gx, gy, gz) = eˆ(g, g)xyz.
CBDH-Assumption by itself is not sufficient to prove that Joux’s protocol is useful
for practical cryptographic purposes. Even though Eve may be unable to recover the en-
tire secret, she may still be able to predict quite a few bits (less than c log k bits for some
constant c; Otherwise, CBDH assumption is violated) of information for eˆ(g, g)xyz with
some confidence. If eˆ(g, g)xyx is to be the basis of a shared secret key, one must bound
the amount of information Eve is able to deduce about it, given gx, gy, and gz . This is
formally captured by the, much stronger, Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion (DBDH-Assumption)
Definition 1. Let {Xρ} and {Yρ} be two ensembles of probability distributions, where
for each ρ both Xρ and Yρ are defined over the same domain. We say that the two
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable if for any probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm D, and any c > 0 we have
|Pr [D (Xρ) = 1]− Pr [D (Yρ) = 1]| <
1
kc
for all sufficiently large k, where the probability is taken over all Xρ, Yρ, and internal
coin tosses of D.
In the remainder of the paper, we will say in short that the two distributions Xρ and Yρ
are computationally indistinguishable.
Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family. We consider the following two ensembles
of distributions:
– {Xρ} of random tuples 〈ρ, g, gx, gy, gz, eˆ(g, g)t〉, where g is a random generator of
G (Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉) and x, y, z, t ∈R Zq .
– {Yρ} of tuples 〈ρ, g, gx, gy, gz, eˆ(g, g)xyz〉, where g is a random generator of G
and x, y, z ∈R Zq.
An algorithm that solves the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman decision problem is a polyno-
mial time probabilistic algorithm that can effectively distinguish these two distributions.
That is, given a tuple coming from one of the two distributions, it should output 0 or
1, and there should be a non-negligible difference between (a) the probability that it
outputs a 1 given an input from {Xρ}, and (b) the probability that it outputs a 1 given
an input from {Yρ}. The bilinear group family G satisfies the DBDH-Assumption if the
two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
Remark. The DBDH-Assumption is implied by a slightly weaker assumption: perfect-
DBDH-Assumption. A perfect-DBDH statistical test for G distinguishes the inputs from
the above {Xρ} and {Yρ} with overwhelming probability. The bilinear group family G
satisfies the perfect-DBDH-Assumption if there is no such probabilistic polynomial-
time statistical test.
3 The scheme IDAK
In this section, we describe our identity-based and authenticated key agreement scheme
IDAK. Let k be the security parameter given to the setup algorithm and IG be a bilinear
group parameter generator. We present the scheme by describing the three algorithms:
Setup, Extract, and Exchange.
Setup: For the input k ∈ Z+, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Run IG on k to generate a bilinear group Gρ = {G,G1, eˆ} and the prime order q
of the two groups G and G1.
2. Pick a random master secret α ∈ Z∗q .
3. Choose cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G and pi : G ×G → Z∗q . In
the security analysis, we view H and pi as random oracles. In practice, we take pi
as a random oracle (secure hash function) from G×G to Z∗
2⌈log q⌉/2
(see Appendix
for details).
The system parameter is 〈q, g,G,G1, eˆ, H, pi〉 and the master secret key is α.
Extract: For a given identification string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algorithm computes a gen-
erator gID = H(ID) ∈ G, and sets the private key dID = gαID where α is the master
secret key.
Exchange: For two participants Alice and Bob whose identification strings are IDA and
IDB respectively, the algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Alice selects x ∈R Z∗q , computes RA = gxIDA , and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob selects y ∈R Z∗q , computes RB = g
y
IDB
, and sends it to Alice.
3. Alice computes sA = pi(RA, RB), sB = pi(RB , RA), and the shared secret skAB
as
eˆ(gIDA , gIDB )
(x+sA)(y+sB)α = eˆ
(
d
(x+sA)
IDA
, gsBIDB ·RB
)
.
4. Bob computes sA = pi(RA, RB), sB = pi(RB, RA), and the shared secret skBA
as
eˆ(gIDA , gIDB )
(x+sA)(y+sB)α = eˆ
(
gsAIDA · RA, d
(y+sB)
IDB
)
.
In the next section, we will show that IDAK protocol is secure in Bellare and Rog-
away [4] model with random oracle plus DBDH-Assumption. We conclude this section
with a theorem which says that the shared secret established by the IDAK key agree-
ment protocol is computationally indistinguishable from a random value.
Theorem 2. Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family, Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉, and g1, g2 be
random generators of G. Assume that DBDH-Assumption holds for G. Then the distri-
butions 〈g1, g2, gx1 , g
y
2 , eˆ(g1, g2)
(x+pi(gx1 ,g
y
2 ))(y+pi(g
y
2 ,g
x
1 ))α〉 and 〈g1, g2, gx1 , g
y
2 , eˆ(g1, g2)
z〉
are computationally indistinguishable, where α, x, y, z are selected from Z∗q uniformly.
Before we give a proof for Theorem 2, we first prove two lemmas that will be used
in the proof of the Theorem.
Lemma 1. (Naor and Reingold [24]) Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family, Gρ =
〈G,G1, eˆ〉, m be a constant, g be a random generator of G, and gˆ = eˆ(g, g). Assume
that the DBDH-Assumption holds for Gρ. Then the two distributions 〈R, (gˆxiyjzl :
i, j, l ≤ m)〉 and 〈R, (gˆuijl : i, j, l ≤ m)〉 are computationally indistinguishable. Here
R denotes the tuple (g, (gxi, gyj , gzl : i, j, l ≤ m)) and xi, yj, zl, uijl ∈R Zq .
Proof. Using a random reduction, Naor and Reingold [24, Lemma 4.4] (see also Shoup
[35, §5.3.2] showed that the two distributions 〈R, (gxiyj : i, j ≤ m)〉 and 〈R, (guij :
i, j ≤ m)〉 are computationally indistinguishable. The proof can be directly modified
to obtain a proof for this Lemma. The details are omitted. 
Lemma 2. Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family, Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉, g be a random
generator of G, gˆ = eˆ(g, g), and f1 and f2 be two polynomial-time computable func-
tions. If the two distributionsX1 = 〈R, gˆf1(x), gˆf2(x)〉 andY1 = 〈R, gˆz1 , gˆz2〉 are com-
putationally indistinguishable, then the two distributions X2 = 〈R1, gˆf1(x)+f2(x)〉 and
Y2 = 〈R2, gˆ
z〉 are computationally indistinguishable, whereR = (g, (gxi : 1 ≤ i ≤ m)),
x = (x1, . . . , xm), and xi, z1, z2, z ∈R Zq.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Let gˆ = eˆ(g, g).By Lemma 1, the two distributions
X = 〈g, gα, gx, gy, gˆαxy, gˆαxpi(g
y,gx), gˆαypi(g
x,gy), gˆαpi(g
x,gy)pi(gy,gx)〉 and
Y = 〈g, gα, gx, gy, gˆz
′
1, gˆz
′
2pi(,g
y,gx), gˆz
′
3pi(g
x,gy), gˆz
′
4pi(g
x,gy)pi(gy,gx)〉
are computationally indistinguishable assuming that DBDH-Assumption holds for G,
where g is a random generator of Gρ and α, x, y, z′1, z′2, z′3, z′4 ∈R Zq. Since pi is a
fixed function from G to Z∗q and q is a prime, it is straightforward to verify that for
any α, x, y ∈ Zq, gˆz
′
2pi(g
y,gx)
, gˆz
′
3pi(g
x,gy)
, and gˆz′4pi(gx,gy)pi(gy,gx) are uniformly (and
independently of each other) distributed over G1. It follows that the distribution
Z = 〈g, gα, gx, gy, gˆz1 , gˆz2 , gˆz3, gˆz4)〉
is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution Y , where z1, z2, z3, z4 ∈R
Zq. Thus X and Z are computationally indistinguishable. The Theorem now follows
from Lemma 2. 
4 The security model
Our security model is based on Bellare and Rogaway [4] security models for key agree-
ment protocols with several modifications. In our model, we assume that we have at
most m ≤ poly(k) protocol participants (principals): ID1, . . . , IDm, where k is the se-
curity parameter. The protocol determines how principals behave in response to input
signals from their environment. Each principal may execute the protocol multiple times
with the same or different partners. This is modelled by allowing each principal to have
different instances that execute the protocol. An oracle Πsi,j models the behavior of the
principal IDi carrying out a protocol session in the belief that it is communicating with
the principal IDj for the sth time. One given instance is used only for one time. Each
Πsi,j maintains a variable view (or transcript) consisting of the protocol run transcripts
so far.
The adversary is modelled by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine that
is assumed to have complete control over all communication links in the network and
to interact with the principals via oracle accesses to Πsi,j . The adversary is allowed to
execute any of the following queries:
– Extract(ID). This allows the adversary to get the long term private key for a new
principal whose identity string is ID.
– Send(Πsi,j , X). This sends message X to the oracle Πsi,j . The output of Πsi,j is
given to the adversary. The adversary can ask the principal IDi to initiate a session
with IDj by a query Send(Πsi,j , λ) where λ is the empty string.
– Reveal(Πsi,j). This asks the oracle to reveal whatever session key it currently
holds.
– Corrupt(i). This asks IDi to reveal the long term private key dIDi .
The difference between the queries Extract and Corrupt is that the adversary can use
Extract to get the private key for an identity string of her choice while Corrupt can
only be used to get the private key of existing principals.
Let Πsij be an initiator oracle (that is, it has received a λ message at the beginning)
and Πs′ji be a responder oracle. If every message that Πsij sends out is subsequently
delivered to Πs′ji , with the response to this message being returned to Πsij as the next
message on its transcript, then we say the oracle Πs′ji matches Πsij . Similarly, if every
message that Πs′ji receives was previously generated by Πsij , and each message that
Πs
′
ji sends out is subsequently delivered to Πsij , with the response to this message being
returned toΠs′ji as the next message on its transcript, then we say the oracleΠsij matches
Πs
′
ji . The details for an exact definition of matching oracles could be found in [3].
For the definition of matching oracles, the reader should be aware the following
scenarios: Even though the oracle Πsij thinks that its matching oracle is Πs
′
ji , the real
matching oracle for Πsij could be Πt
′
ji. For example, if Πsij sends a message X to Πs
′
ji
and Πs′ji replies with Y . The adversary decides not to forward the message Y to Πsij .
Instead, the adversary sends the message X to initiate another oracle Πt′ji and IDi does
not know the existence of this new oracle Πt′ji. The oracle Πt
′
ji replies with Y ′ and
the adversary forwards this Y ′ to Πsij as the responding message for X . In this case,
the transcript of Πsij matches the transcript of Πt
′
ji. Thus we consider Πsij and Πt
′
ji as
matching oracles. In another word, the matching oracles are mainly based the message
transcripts.
In order to define the notion of a secure session key exchange, the adversary is given
an additional experiment. That is, in addition to the above regular queries, the adversary
can choose, at any time during its run, a Test(Πsi,j) query to a completed oracle Πsi,j
with the following properties:
– The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Extract(IDi)
or Extract(IDj).
– The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Corrupt(i)
or Corrupt(j).
– The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the queryReveal(Πsi,j).
– The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Reveal(Πs′j,i)
if the matching oracle Πs′j,i for Πsi,j exists (note that such an oracle may not ex-
ist if the adversary is impersonating the IDj to the oracle Πsi,j). The value of s
may be different from the value of s′ since the adversary may run fake sessions to
impersonate any principals without victims’ knowledge.
Let sksi,j be the value of the session key held by the oracleΠsi,j that has been established
between IDi and IDj . The oracle Πsi,j tosses a coin b ←R {0, 1}. If b = 1, the adver-
sary is given sksi,j . Otherwise, the adversary is given a value r randomly chosen from
the probability distribution of keys generated by the protocol. In the end, the attacker
outputs a bit b′. The advantage that the adversary has for the above guess is defined as
AdvA(k) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Now we are ready to give the exact definition for a secure key agreement protocol.
Definition 2. A key agreement protocol Π is BR-secure if the following conditions are
satisfied for any adversary:
1. If two uncorrupted oracles Πsij and Πs
′
ji have matching conversations (e.g., the ad-
versary is passive) and both of them are complete according to the protocolΠ , then
both oracles will always accept and hold the same session key which is uniformly
distributed over the key space.
2. AdvA(k) is negligible.
In the following, we briefly discuss the attributes that a BR-secure key agreement
protocol achieves.
– Known session keys. The adversary may use Reveal(Πs′i,j) query before or after
the query Test(Πsi,j). Thus in a secure key agreement model, the adversary learns
zero information about a fresh key for session s even if she has learnt keys for other
sessions s′.
– Impersonation attack. If the adversary impersonates IDj to IDi, then she still
learns zero information about the session key that the oracle Πsij holds for this
impersonated IDj since there is no matching oracle for Πsij in this scenario. Thus
A can use Test query to test this session key that Πsij holds.
– Unknown key share. If IDi establishes a session key with IDl though he believes
that he is talking to IDj , then there is an oracle Πsij that holds this session key
skij . At the same time, there is an oracle Πs
′
li′ that holds this session key skij ,
for some i′ (normally i′ = i). During an unknown key share attack, the user IDj
may not know this session key. Since Πsij and Πs
′
li′ are not matching oracles, the
adversary can make the query Reveal(Πs′li′ ) to learn this session key before the
query Test(Πsij). Thus the adversary will succeed for this Test query challenge if
the unknown key share attack is possible.
However, the following important security properties that a secure key agreement scheme
should have are not implied from the original BR-security model.
– Perfect forward secrecy. This property requires that previously agreed session
keys should remain secret, even if both parties’ long-term private key materials
are compromised. Bellare-Rogaway model does not capture this property. Canetti
and Krawczyk’s model [9] use the session-key expiration primitive to capture this
property. Similar modification to Bellare-Rogaway model are required to capture
this property also. We will give a separate proof that the IDAK key agreement
protocol achieves weak perfect forward secrecy. Note that as pointed out in [19],
no two-message key-exchange protocol authenticated with public keys and with no
secure shared state can achieve perfect forward secrecy.
– Key compromise impersonation resilience. If the entity A’s long term private key
is compromised, then the adversary could impersonateA to others, but it should not
be able to impersonate others to A. Similar to wPFS property, Bellare-Rogaway
model does not capture this property. We will give a separate proof that the IDAK
key agreement protocol has this property.
5 The security of IDAK
Before we present the security proof for the IDAK key agreement protocol, we first
prove some preliminary results that will be used in the security proof.
Lemma 3. Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family, Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉, g be a random
generator of G, and pi : G×G→ Zq be a random oracle. Assume DBDH-Assumption
holds for G and let X and Y be two distributions defined as
X = 〈R, gβx0 , gγy0, eˆ(g, g)(x0+pi(g
βx0 ,gγy0))(y0+pi(g
γy0 ,gβx0 ))αβγ , eˆ(g, g)αβγ〉
and Y = 〈R, gβx0 , gγy0 , eˆ(g, g)(x0+pi(gβx0 ,gγy0 ))(y0+pi(gγy0 ,gβx0 ))t, eˆ(g, g)t〉
Then we have
1. The two distributions X and Y are computationally indistinguishable if R is de-
fined as
R =
(
g, gα, gβ, gγ , gx, gr, gA, eˆ
(
gx+βpi(g
x,gA), gA · g
rpi(gA,g
x)
)α)
,
α, β, γ, x, t, x0 are chosen from Z∗q uniformly, gr = gγ or r is either chosen from
Z∗q uniformly, gA and gγy0 are chosen from G within polynomial time according
to a fixed distribution given the view (gx, gr, gα, gβ, gγ , gβx0) without violating
DBDH-Assumption.
2. For any constant m ≤ poly(k), the two distributions X and Y are computationally
indistinguishable if R is defined as:
(g, gα, gβ, gγ , (gxi , grj , gA,l)i,j,l≤m, (eˆ(g
xi+βpi(g
xi ,gA,l), gA,l·g
rjpi(gA,l,g
xi ))α : i, j, l ≤ m))
where α, β, γ, xi are uniformly chosen from Z∗q , rj are either chosen from Z∗q uni-
formly or grj = gγ , and gA,l is chosen within polynomial time according to a
fixed distribution given the view (gxi , grj , gα, gβ, gγ , gβx0 : i, j, l ≤ m) without
violating DBDH-Assumption.
3. For any constant m ≤ poly(k), the two distributions X and Y are computationally
indistinguishable if R = (R1,R2), whereR1 is defined as theR in the item 2, and
R2 is defined as:
((gA,i, g
rj , gA,l)i,j,l≤m, (eˆ(gA,i·g
βpi(gA,i,gA,l), gA,l·g
rjpi(gA,l,gA,i))α : i, j, l ≤ m))
where rj are either chosen fromZ∗q uniformly or grj = gγ , gA,i and gA,l are chosen
within polynomial time according to a fixed distribution given the view (gxi , grj ,
gα, gβ , gγ , gβx0, gγy0 : i, j, l ≤ m) without violating DBDH-Assumption and with
the condition that “gA,i 6= gβx0 or gA,l 6= gγy0”. Note that gA,i and gA,l could
have different distributions.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Theorem 3. Suppose that the functions H and pi are random oracles and the bilinear
group family G satisfies DBDH-Assumption. Then the IDAK scheme is a BR-secure key
agreement protocol.
Proof. See Appendix. 
6 Weak Perfect forward secrecy
In this section, we show that the protocol IDAK achieves weak perfect forward secrecy
property. Perfect forward secrecy property requires that even if Alice and Bob lose their
private keys dIDA = gαIDA and dIDB = g
α
IDB
, the session keys established by Alice
and Bob in the previous sessions are still secure. Krawczyk [19] pointed out that no
two-message key-exchange protocol authenticated with public keys and with no secure
shared state can achieve perfect forward secrecy. Weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS)
property for key agreement protocols sates as follows [19]: any session key established
by uncorrupted parties without active intervention by the adversary is guaranteed to
remain secure even if the parties to the exchange are corrupted after the session key was
erased from the parties memory (for a formal definition, the reader is referred to [19]).
In the following, we show the IDAK achieves wPFS property. Using the simi-
lar primitive of “session-key expiration” as in Canetti and Krawczyk’s model [9], we
can revise Bellare-Rogaway model so that wPFS property is provable also. In Bellare-
Rogaway model, the Test(Πsi,j) query is allowed only if the four properties in Section
4 are satisfied. We can replace the property “the adversary has never issued, at any time
during its run, the query Corrupt(i) or Corrupt(j)” with the property “the adver-
sary has never issued, before the session Πsi,j is complete, the query Corrupt(i) or
Corrupt(j)”. We call this model the wpfsBR model. In the final version of this pa-
per, we will show that the protocol IDAK is secure in the wpfsBR model. Thus IDAK
achieves wPFS property. In the following, we present the essential technique used in the
proof. It is essentially sufficient to show that the two distributions (R, eˆ(gIDA , gIDB )z)
and
(
R, eˆ(gIDA , gIDB )
(x+pi(gxIDA
,gy
IDB
))(y+pi(gy
IDB
,gxIDA
))α
)
are computationally indis-
tinguishable for R = (gαIDA , g
α
IDB
, gxIDA , g
y
IDB
) and uniform at random chosen gIDA ,
gIDB , x, y, z, α. Consequently, it is sufficient to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family, Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉. Assume that
DBDH-Assumption holds for G. Then the two distributions
X = (g1, g2, g
α
1 , g
α
2 , g
x
1 , g
y
2 , eˆ(g1, g2)
xyα)
and Y = (g1, g2, gα1 , gα2 , gx1 , g
y
2 , eˆ(g1, g2)
z)
are computationally indistinguishable for random chosen g1, g2, x, y, z, α.
Proof. We use a random reduction. For a contradiction, assume that there is a polyno-
mial time probabilistic algorithm D that distinguishes X and Y with a non-negligible
probability δk. We construct a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm A that distin-
guishes (R, eˆ(g, g)t) and (R, eˆ(g, g)uvw) with δk, where R = (g, gu, gv, gw) and
u, v, w, t are uniformly at random in Zq . Let the input of A be (R, eˆ(g, g)t˜), where
t˜ is either uvw or uniformly at random in Zq . We construct A as follows. A chooses
random c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 ∈ Zq and sets g1 = gc1 , g2 = gc2 , gα1 = guc1c3 , gα2 = guc2c3 ,
gx1 = g
vc1c4
, gy2 = g
wc2c5
, and eˆ(g1, g2)z˜ = eˆ(g, g)t˜c1c2c3c4c5 . Let A
(
R, eˆ(g, g)t˜
)
=
D
(
g1, g2, g
α
1 , g
α
2 , g
x
1 , g
y
2 , eˆ(g1, g2)
z˜
)
. Note that if t˜ = uvw, then c1, c2, α, x, y are uni-
form in Zq (and independent of each other and of u, v, w) and xyα = z˜. Otherwise,
c1, c2, α, x, y are uniform in Zq and independent of each other and of u, v, w. There-
fore, by the definitions,
Pr [A (R, eˆ(g, g)uvw) = 1] = Pr [D(X ) = 1]
and Pr [A (R, eˆ(g, g)t) = 1] = Pr [D(Y) = 1]
Thus A distinguishes 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)t〉 and 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)uvw〉 with δk.
This is a contradiction. 
Though Theorem 4 shows that the protocol IDAK achieves weak perfect forward
secrecy even if both participating parties’ long term private keys were corrupted, IDAK
does not have perfect forward secrecy when the master secretα were leaked. The perfect
forward secrecy against the corruption of α could be achieved by requiring Bob (the
responder in the IDAK protocol) to send gyIDA in addition to the value RB = g
y
IDB
and
by requiring both parties to compute the shared secret as H(gxyIDA ||skAB) where skAB
is the shared secret established by the IDAK protocol.
7 Key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience
In this section, we informally show that the protocol IDAK has the key compromise
impersonation resilience property. That is, if Alice loses her private key dA = gαIDA ,
then the adversary still could not impersonate Bob to Alice. For a formaly proof of KCI,
we still need to consider the information obtained by the adversary by Reveal, Extract,
Send, Corrupt queries in other sessions. This will be done in the final version of this
paper.
In order to show KCI for IDAK, it is (informally) sufficient to show that the two dis-
tributions
(
R, eˆ
(
gxIDA · g
pi(gxIDA
,RB)
IDA
, RB · g
pi(RB ,g
x
IDA
)
IDB
)α)
and (R, eˆ(gIDA , gIDB )z)
are computationally indistinguishable forR = (gαIDA , g
x
IDA
, RB), where gIDA , gIDB , x, z, α
are chosen uniform at random, and RB is chosen according to some probabilistic poly-
nomial time distribution. Since the value eˆ
(
g
pi(gxIDA
,RB)
IDA
, RB · g
pi(RB ,g
x
IDA
)
IDB
)α
is known,
it is sufficient to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let G = {Gρ} be a bilinear group family, Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉. Assume that
DBDH-Assumption holds for G. Then the two distributions
X =
(
g1, g2, g
α
1 , g
x
1 , RB, eˆ
(
gx1 , RB · g
pi(RB,g
x
1 )
2
)α)
and Y = (g1, g2, gα1 , gx1 , RB, eˆ(g1, g2)z)
are computationally indistinguishable for random chosen g1, g2, x, z, α, where RB is
chosen according to some probabilistic polynomial time distribution.
Proof. Since gx1 is chosen uniform at random, and pi is a random oracle, we may assume
that RB · g
pi(RB ,g
x
1 )
2 is uniformly distributed over G when RB is chosen according to
any probabilistic polynomial time distribution. Thus the proof is similar to the proof
of Theorem 4 and the details are omitted. The theorem could also be proved using the
Splitting lemma [28] which was used to prove the fork lemma. Briefly, the Splitting
lemma translates the fact that when a subset A is “large” in a product space X × Y , it
has many large sections. Using the Splitting lemma, one can show that if D can distin-
guish X and Y , then by replaying D with different random oracle pi, one can get suf-
ficient many tuples (g1, g2, gα1 , gx1 , RB, pi1, pi2) such that (1) pi1(RB , gx1 ) 6 pi2(RB, gx1 );
(2) D distinguishes X1 and Y (respectively X2 and Y) when z is uniformly chosen
but other values takes the values from the above tuple with pi1 (respectively pi2). Since
eˆ
(
gx1 , RB · g
pi1(RB ,g
x
1 )
2
)α
/eˆ
(
gx1 , RB · g
pi2(RB ,g
x
1 )
2
)α
= eˆ (g1, g2)
xα(pi1(RB ,g
x
1 )−pi2(RB ,g
x
1 ))
.
Thus, for the above tuple, we can distinguish eˆ (g1, g2)xα from eˆ (g, g)z for random
chosen z. This is a contradiction with the DBDH-Assumption. 
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The fact that the CBDH-Assumption implies the perfect-CBDH-Assumption is trivial.
The converse is proved by the self-random-reduction technique (see [5,24]). Let O be
a CBDH oracle. That is, there exists a c > 0 such that (1) holds with C replaced with
O. We construct a perfect-CBDH algorithm C which makes use of the oracle O. Given
g, gx, gy, gz ∈ G, algorithm C must compute eˆ(g, g)xyz with overwhelming probability.
Consider the following algorithm: select a, b, c ∈R Zq (unless stated explicitly, we use
x ∈R X to denote that x is randomly chosen from X in the remainder of this paper)
and output
Ix,y,z,a,b,c = O(g, g
x+a, gy+b, gz+c) · eˆ(g, g)−(abz+abc+ayz+ayc+xbz+xbc+xyc).
One can easily verify that if O(ρ, g, gx+a, gy+b, gz+c) = eˆ(g, g)(x+a)(y+b)(z+c), then
Ix,y,z,a,b,c = eˆ(g, g)
xyz
. Consequently, standard amplification techniques can be used
to construct the algorithm C. The details are omitted.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For a contradiction, assume that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D
that distinguishes the two distributionsX2 and Y2 with non-negligible probability δk. In
the following we construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D′ to distinguish
the two distributionsX1 and Y1. D′ is defined by letting D′ (R, X, Y ) = D (R, X · Y )
for allR, andX,Y ∈ G1. By this definition, we havePr [D′r(X1) = 1|R, r] = Pr [Dr(X2) = 1|R, r],
for any fixed internal coin tosses r of D and D′.
Let DDR,r = {X : Dr (R, X) = 1} and DD
′
R,r = {(X,Y ) : D
′
r (R, X, Y ) = 1}.
By definition of D′, we have DD′R,r = {(X,Y ) : X · Y ∈ DDR,r}. It follows that
|DD
′
R,r| = q|D
D
R,r| andPr [D′r(Y1) = 1|R, r] = |DD
′
R,r|/q
2 = |DDR,r|/q = Pr [Dr(Y2) = 1|R, r].
Thus we have
|Pr [D′ (X1) = 1]− Pr [D
′(Y1) = 1]|
=
∣∣∣∑R,r Pr[R, r] · (Pr [D′r(X1) = 1|R, r]− Pr [D′r(Y1) = 1|R, r])
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∑R,r Pr[R, r] · (Pr [Dr(X2) = 1|R, r]− Pr [Dr(Y2) = 1|R, r])
∣∣∣
= |Pr [D(X2) = 1]− Pr [D(Y2) = 1]|
> δk.
Hence,D′ distinguishes the distributionsX1 and Y1 with non-negligible probability δk.
This contradicts the assumption of the Lemma.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The Lemma could be proved using complicated version of the Splitting lemma by
Pointcheval-Stern [28] (see the proof of Theorem 7). In the following, we use the ran-
dom reduction to prove the lemma.
1. For a contradiction, assume that there is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm
D that distinguishes X and Y . We construct a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm
A that distinguishes 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)a〉 and 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)uvw〉 with δk,
where u, v, w, a are uniformly at random in Zq.
Let the input of A be 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)a˜〉, where a˜ is either uvw or uniformly
at random in Zq . A chooses uniformly at random c1, c2, c3, x, x0 ∈ Zq, sets gα =
gc1u+c2 , gβ = gv+c3 , gγ = gw+c4 , chooses uniformly at random r ∈ Zq or lets
gr = gβ , chooses gγy0, gA ∈ G within polynomial time according to any distribution
given the view (gx, gr, gα, gβ, gγ , gβx0) (the distributions for gA ∈ G and gγy0 could
be different). Since gx and gβx0 are uniformly chosen from G, we may assume that
the values of pi(gx, gA) and pi(gγy0 , gβx0) are unknown yet. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that x + βpi(gx, gA) and y0 + pi(gγy0, gβx0) take values c5 and c6
respectively, where c5 and c6 are uniformly chosen from Zq. In a summary, the value
of R could be computed from gu, gv, gw, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 efficiently. A then sets
eˆ(g, g)t˜ = eˆ(g, g)c1a˜+c4(c1u+c2)(v+c3)+w(c1uc3+c1v+c2c3).
A can compute eˆ(g, g)(x0+pi(gβx0 ,gγy0 ))(y0+pi(gγy0 ,gβx0))t˜ using the values of eˆ(g, g)t˜,
x0, pi(g
βx0 , gγy0), c6. Let A
(
g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)a˜
)
= D(X˜ ), where X˜ is obtained
from Y by replacing t with t˜ and taking the remaining values as defined above.
Note that if a˜ = uvw, then t˜ = αβγ, and X˜ is distributed according to the distribu-
tion X . That is, α, β, γ, x, x0 are uniform in Zq and independent of each other and of
(u, v, w), (r, gA, gγy0) is chosen according to the specified distributions without vio-
lating DBDH-Assumption. Otherwise, X˜ is distributed according to the distribution X ,
and t˜ is uniform in Zq and independent of α, β, γ, x, x0, r, u, v, w, gA, gγy0 . Therefore,
by definitions,
Pr [A (g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)uvw) = 1] = Pr [D(X ) = 1]
and Pr [A (g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)a) = 1] = Pr [D(Y) = 1]
Thus A distinguishes 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)a〉 and 〈g, gu, gv, gw, eˆ(g, g)uvw〉 with δk,
where a is uniform at random in Zq. This is a contradiction.
2. This part of the Lemma could be proved in the same way. The details are omitted.
3. Since “gA,i 6= gβx0 or gA,l 6= gγy0”, we may assume that the values of pi(gA,i, gA,l)
and pi(gA,l, gA,i) are unknown yet. By the random oracle property of pi, this part of the
Lemma could be proved in the same way as in item 1. The details are omitted.
9 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. By Theorem 2, the condition 1 in the Definition 2 is satisfied for the IDAK key
agreement protocol. In the following, we show that the condition 2 is also satisfied.
For a contradiction, assume that the adversary A has non-negligible advantage
δk = Adv
A(k) in guessing the value of b after the Test query. We show how to
construct a simulator S that uses A as an oracle to distinguish the distributions X
and Y in the item 3 of Lemma 3 with non-negligible advantage 2δk(qE − 2)2/q4E ,
where qE denotes the number of distinct H-queries that the algorithm A has made.
The game between the challenger and the simulator S starts with the challenger first
generating bilinear groups Gρ = 〈G,G1, eˆ〉 by running the algorithm Instance Gen-
erator. The challenger then chooses α, β, γ, t ∈R Zq and b ∈R {0, 1}. The chal-
lenger gives the tuple 〈ρ, g, gα, gβ, gγ , eˆ(g, g)t˜〉 to the algorithm S where t˜ = αβγ
if b = 1 and t˜ = t otherwise. During the simulation, the algorithm S can ask the
challenger to provide randomly chosen gxi . S may then choose (with the help of A
perhaps) gA,l within polynomial time according to any distribution given the view
(gxi , grj , gα, gβ , gγ , gαx0 : i, j, l ≤ m) and sends gA,l to the challenger. The challenger
responds with eˆ(gxi+βpi(gxi ,gA,l), gA,l · grjpi(gA,l,g
xi ))α. At the end of the simulation,
the algorithm S is supposed to output its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b. It should be noted that
if b = 1, then the output of the challenger together with the values gA,l selected by the
simulator S is the tuple X of Lemma 3, and is the tuple Y of Lemma 3 if b = 0. Thus
the simulator S could be used to distinguish X and Y of Lemma 3.
The algorithm S selects two integers I, J ≤ qE randomly and works by interacting
with A as follows:
Setup: Algorithm S gives A the IDAK system parameters 〈q,G,G1, eˆ, H, pi〉 where
q,G,G1, eˆ are parameters from the challenger, H and pi are random oracles controlled
by S as follows.
H-queries: At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle H using the queries
Extract(IDi) or GetID(IDi) = H(IDi). To respond to these queries algorithm S
maintains an H list that contains a list of tuples 〈IDi, gIDi〉. The list is initially empty.
When A queries the oracle H at a point IDi, S responds as follows:
1. If the query IDi appears on the H list in a tuple 〈IDi, gIDi〉, then S responds with
H(IDi) = gIDi .
2. Otherwise, if this is the I-th new query of the random oracle H , S responds with
gIDi = H(IDi) = g
β
, and adds the tuple 〈IDi, gβ〉 to the H list. If this is the J-th
new query of the random oracle, S responds with gIDi = H(IDi) = gγ , and adds
the tuple 〈IDi, gγ〉 to the H list.
3. In the remaining case, S selects a random ri ∈ Zq, responds with gIDi = H(IDi) =
gri , and adds the tuple 〈IDi, gri〉 to the H list.
pi-queries: At any time the challenger, the algorithm A, and the algorithm S can query
the random oracle pi. To respond to these queries algorithm S maintains a pilist that
contains a list of tuples 〈g1, g2, pi(g1, g2)〉. The list is initially empty. When A queries
the oracle pi at a point (g1, g2), S responds as follows: If the query (g1, g2) appears on
the pilist in a tuple 〈(g1, g2), pi(g1, g2)〉, then S responds with pi(g1, g2). Otherwise, S
selects a random vi ∈ Zq, responds with pi(g1, g2) = vi, and adds the tuple 〈(g1, g2), vi〉
to the pilist. Technically, the random oracle pi could be held by an independent third
party to avoid the confusion that the challenger also needs to access this random oracle
also.
Query phase: S responds to A’s queries as follows.
For a GetID(IDi) query,S runs theH-queries to obtain a gIDi such thatH(IDi) =
gIDi , and responds with gIDi .
For an Extract(IDi) query for the long term private key, if i = I or i = J , then
S reports failure and terminates. Otherwise, S runs the H-queries to obtain gIDi =
H(IDi) = g
ri
, and responds dIDi = (gα)
ri = gαIDi .
For a Send(Πsi,j , X) query, we distinguish the following three cases:
1. X = λ. If i = I or J , S asks the challenger for a random Ri ∈ G (note that S
does not know the discrete logarithm of Ri with base gIDi), otherwise S chooses a
random ui ∈ Z∗q and sets Ri = g
ui
IDi
. S lets Πsi,j reply with Ri. That is, we assume
that IDi is carrying out an IDAK key agreement protocol with IDj and IDi sends
the first message Ri to IDj .
2. X 6= λ and the transcript of the oracle Πsi,j is empty. In this case, Πsi,j is the
responder to the protocol and has not sent out any message yet. If i = I or J , S asks
the challenger for a random Ri ∈ G, otherwise S chooses a random ui ∈ Z∗q and
sets Ri = g
ui
IDi
. S lets Πsi,j reply with Ri and marks the oracle Πsi,j as completed.
3. X 6= λ and the transcript of the oracle Πsi,j is not empty. In this case, Πsi,j is the
protocol initiator and should have sent out the first message already. ThusΠsi,j does
not need to respond anything. After processing the query Send(Πsi,j , X), S marks
the oracle Πsi,j as completed.
For a Reveal(Πsi,j) query, if i 6= I and i 6= J , S computes the session key
skij = eˆ(g
pi(Rj,Ri)
IDj
· Rj , d
(ui+pi(Ri,Rj))
IDi
) and responds with skij , here Rj is the mes-
sage received by Πsi,j . Note that the message Rj may not necessarily be sent by the
oracle Πs′j,i for some s′ since it could have been a bogus message from A. Otherwise,
i = I or i = J . Without loss of generality, we assume that i = I . In this case, the or-
acle ΠsI,j dose not know its private key gβα. Thus it needs help from the challenger to
compute the shared session key. Let RI and Rj be the messages that ΠsI,j has sent out
and received respectively. ΠsI,j gives these two values to the challenger and the chal-
lenger computes the shared session key skIj = eˆ
(
g
pi(Rj,Ri)
IDj
·Rj , R
αh
I g
pi(RI ,Rj)αβ
)
.
ΠsI,j then responds with kIj .
For a Corrupt(i) query, if i = I or i = J , then S reports failure and terminates.
Otherwise, S responds with dIDi = (gα)
ri = gαIDi .
For the Test(Πsi,j) query, if i 6= I or j 6= J , then S reports failure and terminates.
Otherwise, assume that i = I and j = J . Let RI = guIIDI be the message that Π
s
i,j sends
out (note that the challenger generated this message) and RJ = guJIDJ be the message
that Πsi,j receives (note that RJ could be the message that the challenger generated or
could be generated by the algorithm A). S gives the messages RI and RJ to the chal-
lenger. The challenger computesX = eˆ(g, g)(uI+pi(RI ,RJ ))(uJ+pi(RJ ,RI))t˜ and gives X
to S. S responds with X . Note that if t˜ = αβγ, then X is the session key. Otherwise,
X is a uniformly distributed group element.
Guess: After the Test(Πsi,j) query, the algorithm A may issue other queries before fi-
nally outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. Algorithm S outputs b′ as its guess to the challenger.
Claim: If S does not abort during the simulation then A’s view is identical to its view
in the real attack. Furthermore, if S does not abort, then
∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12 ∣∣ > δk, where
the probability is over all random coins used by S and A.
Proof of Claim: The responses to H-queries and pi-queries are the same as in the real
attack since the response is uniformly distributed. All responses to the getID queries,
private key extract queries, message delivery queries, reveal queries, and corrupt queries
are valid. It remains to show that the response to the test query is valid also. When t˜ is
uniformly distributed overZq, then Theorem 2 shows thatX = eˆ(g, g)(uI+pi(RI ,RJ ))(uJ+pi(RJ ,RI))t˜
is uniformly distributed over G and is computationally indistinguishable from a ran-
dom value before A’s view. Therefore, by definition of the algorithm A, we have∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12 ∣∣ > δk. 
Suppose A makes a total of qE H-queries. We next calculate the probability that S
does not abort during the simulation. The probability that S does not abort for Extract
queries is (qE − 2)/qE . The probability that S does not abort for Corrupt queries is
(qE − 2)/qE . The probability that S does not abort for Test queries is 2/q2E . Therefore,
the probability that S does not abort during the simulation is 2(qE−2)2/q4E . This shows
that S’s advantage in distinguishing the distributions X and Y in Lemma 3 is at least
2δk(qE − 2)
2/q4E which is non-negligible.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, it remains to show that the communications
between S and the challenger are carried out according to the distributions X and Y of
Lemma 3. For a Reveal(ΠsI,j) query, the challenger outputs eˆ
(
g
pi(Rj ,RI)
IDj
· Rj , R
αh
I g
pi(RI ,Rj)αβ
)
to the algorithm S. Let RI = gx, Rj = gA, and gIDj = gr. Then x is chosen uniform
at random from Zq, r is chosen uniform at random from Z∗q when j 6= J or r = γ
when j = J , and the value of gA is chosen by the algorithmA or by the algorithm S or
by the challenger in probabilistic polynomial time according to the current views. For
example, if gA is chosen by the algorithm A, then A may generate gA as the combina-
tion (e.g., multiplication) of some previously observed messages/values or generate it
randomly. Thus the communication between the challenger and the algorithm S during
Reveal(ΠsI,j) queries is carried out according to the distributions X and Y of Lemma
3. The case for Reveal(ΠsJ,j) queries is the same.
For the Test(ΠsI,J ) query, the challenger outputsX = eˆ(g, g)(uI+pi(RI ,RJ ))(uJ+pi(RJ ,RI))t˜
to the algorithm S, where RI = gβuI and RJ = gγuJ . Let x0 = uI and y0 = uJ . Then
x0 is chosen uniform at random from Zq and the value of gγy0 is chosen by the algo-
rithm A or by the challenger in probabilistic polynomial time according to the current
views. Similarly, A may choose gγy0 as the combination (e.g., multiplication) of some
previously observed messages/values. The communication between the challenger and
the algorithm S during the Test(ΠsI,J ) query is carried out according to the distribu-
tions X and Y of Lemma 3.
It should be noted that after the Test(ΠsI,J ) query, the adversary may create bogus
oracles for the participants IDI and IDJ and send bogus messages that may depend
on all existing communicated messages (including messages held by the oracle ΠsI,J )
and then reveal session keys from these oracles. In particular, the adversary may play
a man in the middle attack by modifying the messages sent from ΠsI,J to Πs
′
J,I and
modifying the messages sent fromΠs′J,I toΠsI,J . Then the oraclesΠs
′
J,I andΠsI,J are not
matching oracles. Thus A can reveal the session key held by the oracle Πs′J,I before the
guess. In the R2 part in the distributions X and Y of Lemma 3, we have the condition
“gA,i 6= g
βx0 or gA,l 6= g
γy0
” (this condition holds since the algorithm A has not
revealed the matching oracles for ΠsI,J ). If both gA,i 6= gβx0 and gA,l 6= gγy0 , then the
oracle Πs′J,I is a matching oracle for ΠsI,J and A is not allowed to reveal the session
key held by the oracle Πs′J,I . Thus the communication between the challenger and the
algorithm S during these Test(ΠsI,J) query is carried out according to the distributions
X and Y of Lemma 3.
In the summary, all communications between the challenger and S are carried out
according to the distributions X and Y of Lemma 3. This completes the proof of the
Theorem. 
10 Practical considerations and applications
10.1 The function pi
Though in the security proof of IDAK key agreement protocol, pi is considered as a
random oracle. In practice, we can use following simplified pi functions.
– pi is a random oracle (secure hash function) from G×G to Z∗
2⌈log q⌉/c
(e.g., c = 2).
– If g1 = (xg1 , yg1), g2 = (xg2 , yg2) ∈ G are points on an elliptic curve, then
let pi(g1, g2) = x¯g mod 2|xg|/2 where x¯g = xg1 ⊕ xg2 . That is, pi(g1, g2) is the
exclusive-or of the second half parts of the first coordinates of the elliptic curve
points g1 and g2.
– pi is a random oracle that the output only depends on the the first input variable or
any of the above function restricted in such a way that the output only depends on
the the first input variable. In another word, pi : G→ Z∗q .
It should be noted any pi function, for which Lemma 3 holds, can be used in the IDAK
protocol. Though we do not know whether Lemma 3 holds for pi functions that we
have listed above, we have strong evidence that this is true. First, if we assume that the
group G2 is a generic group in the sense of Nechaev [25] and Shoup [34]. Then we
can prove that Lemma 3 holds for the above pi functions. Secondly, if the distribution
G(gx, gr, gα, gβ, gγ , gβx0) in Lemma 3 is restricted to the distribution:
{gf(x,r,α,β,γ,βx0,y) : f is a linear function, y is a tuple of uniformly random values from Zq}.
Then we can prove that Lemma 3 holds for the above pi functions. We may conjecture
that the adversary algorithm A can only generate gA and gγy0 according to the above
distribution unless CDH-Assumption fails for G. Thus, under this conjecture (without
the condition that G2 is a generic group), the above list of pi functions can be used in
IDAK protocol securely.
10.2 Performance
Our analysis in this section will be based on the assumption that pi is a random oracle
(secure hash function) from G×G to Z∗
2⌈log q⌉/2
. Since the computational cost for Alice
is the same as that for Bob. In the following, we will only analyze Alice’s computation.
First, Alice needs to choose a random number x and compute gxIDA in the group
G. In order for Alice to compute sk = eˆ
(
gsBIDB · RB, g
(x+sA)α
IDA
)
, she needs to do 1.5
exponentiation in G, one multiplication in G, and one pairing. Thus in total, she needs
to do 2.5 exponentiation in G, one multiplication in G, and one pairing.
Alternatively, Alice can compute the shared secret as sk = eˆ
(
gsBIDB · RB, g
α
IDA
)(x+sA)
.
Thus for the entire IDAK protocol, Alice needs to do 1.5 exponentiation in G (one for
gxIDA and 0.5 for g
sB
IDB
), one multiplication in G, one pairing, and one exponentiation in
G1.
The IDAK protocol could be sped up by letting each participant do some pre-
computation. For example, Alice can compute the values of gxIDA and g
xα
IDA
before the
protocol session. During the IDAK session, Alice can compute the shared secret as
sk = eˆ
(
gsBIDB · RB, g
xα
IDA
· gαsAIDA
)
which needs 1 exponentiation in G (0.5 for gsBIDB and
0.5 for gαsAIDA ), 2 multiplications in G, and one pairing. Alternatively, Alice can compute
the shared secret as sk = eˆ
(
gsBIDB ·RB, g
α
IDA
)x+sA
which needs 0.5 exponentiation in
G, one multiplication in G, one pairing, and one exponentiation in G1. In a summary,
Figure 1 lists the computational cost for Alice (an analysis of all other identity based
key agreement protocols shows IDAK is the most efficient one, details will be given in
the final version of this paper).
without pre-computation with pre-computation
choice 1 choice 2 choice 1 choice 2
pairing 1 1 1 1
exponentiation in G 2.5 1.5 1 0.5
multiplication in G 1 1 2 1
exponentiation in G1 0 1 0 1
Fig. 1. IDAK Computational Cost for Alice
